Abstract. We propose axiomatizing some stochastic games, in a continuous state space setting, using continuous belief functions, resp. plausibilities, instead of measures. Then, stochastic games are just variations on continuous Markov chains. We argue that drawing at random along a belief function is the same as letting the probabilistic player P play first, then letting the non-deterministic player C play demonically. The same holds for an angelic C, using plausibilities instead. We then define a simple modal logic, and characterize simulation in terms of formulae of this logic. Finally, we show that (discounted) payoffs are defined and unique, where in the demonic case, P maximizes payoff, while C minimizes it.
P draws at random a possible choice set for C, who then picks non-deterministically from it. Additionally, our model accommodates state spaces that are discrete, or continuous cpos, or topological spaces such as R n , without any change to be made. Mislove et al. [21] consider a model where non-determinism is chaotic, i.e., based on a variant of Plotkin's powerdomain. We concentrate on demonic non-determinism, which is based on the Smyth powerdomain instead. For angelic non-determinism, see [14, chapitre 6] , and [14, chapitre 7] for chaotic non-determinism.
Bisimulations have been studied in the above models. There are many variants on probabilistic automata [26, 16, 23] . Mislove et al. [21] show that (bi)simulation in their model is characterized by a logic similar to [8] , with an added disjunction operator. Our result is similar, for a smaller logic, with one less modality. Segala and Turrini [27] compare various notions of bisimulations in these contexts.
We have already mentioned cooperative games and belief functions. See the abundant literature [6, 7, 28, 13, 24, 2] . We view belief functions as generalized probabilities; the competing view as a basis for a theory of evidence is incompatible [15] .
An obvious approach to studying probabilistic phenomena is to turn to measure theory and measurable spaces, see e.g. [3] . However, we hope to demonstrate that the theory of cooperative games in the case of infinite state spaces X is considerably more comfortable when X is a topological space, and we only measure opens instead of Borel subsets. This is in line with the theory of continuous valuations [17] , which has had considerable success in semantics.
We use Choquet integration to integrate along capacities ν [4] . This is exactly the notion that Tix [30] used more recently, too, and coincides with the Jones integral [17] for integration along continuous valuations. Finally, we should also note that V. Danos and M. Escardo have also come up (private comm.) with a notion of integration that generalizes Choquet integration, at least when integrating with respect to a convex game.
Preliminaries
Our state spaces X are topological spaces. We assume the reader to be familiar with (point-set) topology, in particular topology of T 0 but not necessarily Hausdorff spaces. See [12, 1, 20] for background. Let int(A) denote the interior of A, cl(A) its closure.
The Scott topology on a poset X, with ordering ≤, has as opens the upward-closed subsets U (i.e., x ∈ U and x ≤ y imply y ∈ U ) such that for every directed family (x i ) i∈I having a least upper bound sup i∈I x i inside U , some x i is already in U . The way-below relation ≪ is defined by x ≪ y iff for any directed family (z i ) i∈I with a least upper bound z such that y ≤ z, then x ≤ z i for some i ∈ I. A poset is continuous iff ↓ ↓ y = {x ∈ X|x ≪ y} is directed, and has x as least upper bound. Then every open U can be written x∈U ↑ ↑ x, where ↑ ↑ x = {y ∈ X|x ≪ y}.
Every topological space X has a specialization quasi-ordering ≤, defined by: x ≤ y iff every open that contains x contains y. X is T 0 iff ≤ is a (partial) ordering. That of the Scott topology of a quasi-ordering ≤ is ≤ itself. A subset A ⊆ X is saturated iff A is the intersection of all opens that contain it; alternatively, iff A is upward-closed in ≤. Every open is upward-closed. Let ↑ A denote the upward-closure of A under a quasiordering ≤, ↓ A its downward-closure. A T 0 space is sober iff every irreducible closed subset is the closure cl{x} =↓ x of a (unique) point x. The Hofmann-Mislove Theorem implies that every sober space is well-filtered [18] , i.e., given any filtered family of saturated compacts (Q i ) i∈I in X, and any open U , i∈I Q i ⊆ U iff Q i ⊆ U for some i ∈ I. In particular, i∈I Q i is saturated compact. X is locally compact iff whenever x ∈ U (U open) there is a saturated compact Q such that x ∈ int(Q) ⊆ Q ⊆ U . Every continuous cpo is sober and locally compact in its Scott topology. We shall consider the space R of all reals with the Scott topology of its natural ordering ≤. Its opens are ∅, R, and the intervals (t, +∞), t ∈ R. R is a stably locally compact, continuous cpo. Since we equip R with the Scott topology, our continuous functions f : X → R are those usually called lower semi-continuous in the mathematical literature.
We call capacity on X any function ν from O(X), the set of all opens of X, to R + , such that ν(∅) = 0 (a.k.a., a set function.) A game ν is a monotonic capacity, i.e., U ⊆ V implies ν(U ) ≤ ν(V ). (The name "game" is unfortunate, as there is no obvious relationship between this and games as they are usually defined in computer science, in particular with stochastic games. The name stems from cooperative games in economics, where X is the set of players, not states.) A valuation is a modular game ν, i.e., one such that ν(U ∪ V ) + ν(U ∩ V ) = ν(U ) ∩ ν(V ) for every opens U, V . A game is continuous iff ν( i∈I U i ) = sup i∈I ν(U i ) for every directed family (U i ) i∈I of opens. Continuous valuations have a convenient theory that fits topology well [17, 18] .
The Dirac valuation δ x at x ∈ X is the continuous valuation mapping each open U to 1 if x ∈ U , to 0 otherwise. (Note that δ x = u {x} , by the way.) A finite linear combination 
Continuous Games, and Belief Functions
Defining the "preprobabilities" alluded to in the introduction is best done by strengthening super-additivity. A game ν on X on X is convex iff ν(U ∪ V ) + ν(U ∩ V ) ≥ ν(U )+ν(V ) for every opens U, V . It is concave if the opposite inequality holds. Convex games are a cornerstone of economic theory. E.g., Shapley's Theorem states that (on a finite space) the core {p valuation on X|ν ≤ p, ν(X) = p(X)} of any convex game ν is non-empty, which implies the existence of economic equilibria [13, 22] . But this has only been studied on discrete spaces (finiteness is implicit in [13] , notably). Finite, and more generally discrete spaces are sets X, equipped with the discrete topology, so one may see our topological approach as a generalization of previous approaches.
Recall that the unanimity game u A is defined by u A (U ) = 1 if A ⊆ U , u A (U ) = 0 otherwise. Clearly, u A is convex. It is in fact more. Call a game ν totally convex (the standard name, when X is discrete, i.e., when U i is an arbitrary subset of X, is "totally monotonic"; we changed the name so as to name total concavity the dual of total monotonicity) iff:
for every finite family
of opens (n ≥ 1), where |I| denotes the cardinality of I. A belief function is a totally convex game. The dual notion of total concavity is obtained by replacing by and conversely in (1), and turning ≥ into ≤. A plausibility is a totally concave game. If ≥ is replaced by = in (1), then we retrieve the familiar inclusion-exclusion principle from statistics. In particular any (continuous) valuation is a (continuous) belief function. Clearly, any belief function is a convex game. The converses of both statements fail: On X = {1, 2, 3} with the discrete topology, u {1,2} is a belief function but not a valuation, and
When X is finite, it is well-known [13] that any capacity ν can be written A =∅,A⊆X α A u A for some coefficients α A ∈ R, in a unique way. Also, ν is a belief function iff all coefficients are non-negative. An interpretation of this formula is that ν is essentially a probabilistic choice of some non-empty subset A, with probability α A , from which C can choose an element y ∈ A non-deterministically.
Our first result is to show that this result transfers, in some form, to the general topological case. Let Q(X) be the Smyth powerdomain of X, i.e., the space of all nonempty compact saturated subsets Q of X, ordered by reverse inclusion ⊇. Q(X) is equipped with its Scott topology, and is known to provide an adequate model of demonic non-determinism in semantics [1] . When X is well-filtered and locally compact, Q(X) is a continuous cpo. Its Scott topology is generated by the basic open sets
The relevance of Q(X) here can be obtained by realizing that a finite linear combination n i=1 a i u A i with positive coefficients is a continuous belief function iff every subset A i is compact; and that u A i = u ↑A i . Any such linear combination that is continuous is therefore of the form n i=1 a i u Q i , with Q i ∈ Q(X). We call such belief functions simple. Returning to the interpretation above, this can be intuitively seen as a probabilistic choice of some set Q i with probability a i , from which C will choose y ∈ Q i ; additionally, Q i is an element of Q(X), the traditional domain for demonic non-determinism.
So any simple belief function ν can be matched with a (simple) valuation
for every open U of X. This is exactly the sense in which continuous belief functions are essentially continuous valuations on the space Q(X) of non-deterministic choices.
Theorem 1. For any continuous valuation
Conversely, let X be a well-filtered and locally compact space. For every continuous belief function ν on X there is a unique continuous valuation ν
Proof. (Sketch.) The first part follows by computation. For the second part, observe that
|I|+1 ν i∈I U i is well-defined and monotonic. Let ν * (U) be the least upper bound of P Q∈J int(Q) , when J ranges over finite subsets of U: ν * is monotonic, con-
, and fairly heavy computation shows that ν * is modular. Uniqueness is easy.
⊓ ⊔ Next, we show that this bijection is actually an isomorphism, i.e., it also preserves order and therefore the Scott topology. To this end, define the ordering ≤ on all capacities, not just valuations, by
for every open U of X. We start by characterizing it in the manner of Jones' splitting lemma. This [17, Theorem 4.10] states that
t ij ≤ b j for each j, and whenever t ij = 0 then x i ≤ y j . (Jones proves it for cpos, but it holds on any topological space [29, Theorem 2.4, Corollary 2.6].) We show:
It follows that: (A) for any two simple belief functions ν, ν It follows that continuous belief functions are really the same thing as (sub-)probabilities over the set of demonic choice sets Q ∈ Q(X).
Theorem 3.
Let X be well-filtered and locally compact. The function ν → ν * defines an order-isomorphism from Cd ≤1 (X) to V ≤1 (Q(X)).
As a side note, (up to the ≤ 1 subscript) V ≤1 (Q(X)) is exactly the space into which Edalat [10] embeds a space of measures on X. The above Theorem states that the space of objects for which we can do this is exactly Cd ≤1 (X).
Dually, we may mix probabilistic choice with angelic non-determinism. Space does not permit us to describe this in detail, see [14, chapitre 6] . The point is that the space Pb ≤1 (X) of continuous plausibilities is order-isomorphic to V ≤1 (H u (X)), whenever X is stably locally compact, where the (topological) Hoare powerdomain H u (X) of X is the set of non-empty closed subsets of X, with the upper topology of the inclusion ordering, generated by the subbasic sets U = {F ∈ H(X)|F ∩U = ∅}, U open in X. The argument goes through a nice notion of convex-concave duality, which intuitively exchanges good (concave) and evil (convex). The case of chaotic non-determinism is more complex, see [14, chapitre 7] .
We introduce the standard notion of integration along games ν. This is mostly wellknown [13] ; adapting to the topological case is easy, so we omit proofs [14, chapitre 4] .
Let ν be a game on X, and f be continuous from X to R. Recall that we equip R with its Scott topology, so that f is really what is known otherwise as lower semicontinuous. Assume f bounded, too, i.e., inf x∈X f (x) > −∞, sup x∈X f (x) < +∞. The Choquet integral of f along ν is:
where both integrals on the right are improper Riemann integrals. This is well-defined, since f −1 (t, +∞) is open for every t ∈ R by assumption, and ν measures opens. Also, since f is bounded, the improper integrals above really are ordinary Riemann integrals over some closed intervals. The function t → ν(f −1 (t, +∞)) is decreasing, and every decreasing (even non-continuous, in the usual sense) function is Riemann-integrable, therefore the definition makes sense.
An alternate definition consists in observing that any step function n i=0 a i χ U i , where a 0 ∈ R, a 1 , . . . , a n ∈ R + , X = U 0 ⊇ U 1 ⊇ . . . ⊇ U n is a decreasing sequence of opens, and χ U is the indicator function of U (χ U (x) = 1 if x ∈ X, χ U (x) = 0 otherwise) is continuous, and of integral along ν equal to n i=0 a i ν(U i )-for any game ν. It is well-known that every bounded continuous function f can be written as the least upper bound of a sequence of step functions f K = a+
. Then the integral of f along ν is the least upper bound of the increasing sequence of the integrals of f K along ν.
The main properties of Choquet integration are as follows. First, the integral is increasing in its function argument: if f ≤ g then the integral of f along ν is less than or equal to that of g along ν. If ν is continuous, then integration is also Scott-continuous in its function argument. The integral is also monotonic and Scott-continuous in the game ν, provided the function we integrate takes only non-negative values, or provided ν is normalized, i.e., ν(X) = 1. Integration is linear in the game, too, so integrating along n i=1 a i ν i is the same as taking the integrals along each ν i , and computing the obvious linear combination. However, Choquet integration is not linear in the function integrated, unless the game ν is a valuation. Still, it is positively homogeneous: integrating αf for α ∈ R + yields α times the integral of f . It is additive on comonotonic functions f, g : X → R (i.e., there is no pair x, x ′ ∈ X such that f (x) < f (x ′ ) and g(x) > g(x ′ )). It is super-additive (the integral of f + g is at least that of f plus that of g) when ν is convex, in particular when ν is a belief function, and sub-additive when ν is concave. See [13] for the finite case, [14, chapitre 4] for the topological case.
One of the most interesting things is that integrating with respect to a unanimity game consists in taking minima. This suggests that unanimity games indeed model some demonic form of non-determinism. Imagine f (x) is the amount of money you gain by going to state x. The following says that taking the average amount of money with respect to a demonic adversary C will give you back the least amount possible.
Proposition 1. For any continuous f
Moreover, if A is compact, then the inf is attained: this equals min x∈A f (x).
Since Choquet integration is linear in the game, the integral of f along a simple belief function
this is the expected min-value of f obtained by drawing Q i at random with probability a i (P plays) then letting C nondeterministically move to the state x ∈ Q i that minimizes the gain. We can generalize this to non-discrete probabilities over Q(X) by using the ν → ν * isomorphism:
Theorem 4. For any bounded continuous function f : X → R, let f * be the function from Q(X) to R defined by f * (Q) = min x∈Q f (x). Say that a capacity ν is linearly extensible from below if and only if there is continuous valuation P on Q(X) with:
for every bounded continuous f . If X is well-filtered and locally compact, then the capacities that are linearly extensible from below are exactly the continuous belief functions, and P must be ν * in (3) .
It follows in particular that whenever ν is the least upper bound of a directed family (ν i ) i∈I of simple belief functions ν i , then integrating f : X → R with respect to ν can be computed by taking least upper bounds of linear combinations of mins. Therefore the Choquet integral along continuous belief functions coincides with Edalat's lower R-integral [10] , which was only defined for measures. This can be dualized to the case of plausibilities ν, assuming X stably locally compact [14, théorème 6.3.17] . Then we talk about capacities that are linearly extensible from above. There is an isomorphism ν → ν * such that ν * ( U ) = ν(U ) for all U , and integrating f along ν amounts to integrating f * along ν * , where for every F ∈ H u (X), f * (F ) = sup x∈F f (x). (I.e., C now maximizes our gain.) Then the Choquet integral along continuous plausibilities coincides with Edalat's upper R-integral [10] .
Ludic Transition Systems, Logic, Simulation, Rewards
Let J ≤1 (X) be the space of all continuous games ν on X with ν(X) ≤ 1. This is equipped with its Scott topology. It will be practical to consider another topology. The weak topology on a subspace Y of J ≤1 (X) is the topology generated by the subbasic open sets [U > r] = {ν ∈ Y |ν(U ) > r}, U open in X, r ∈ R. It is in general coarser than the Scott topology, and coincides with it when Y = V ≤1 (X) and X is a continuous cpo [30, Satz 4.10] . One can show that the weak topology is exactly the coarsest that makes continuous all functionals mapping ν ∈ Y to the integral of f along ν, for all f : X → R + bounded continuous. (See [14, section 4.5] for details.) By analogy with Markov kernels and LMPs, define a ludic transition system as a family θ = (θ ℓ ) ℓ∈L , where L is a given set of actions, and each θ ℓ is a continuous map from the state space X to J ≤1 wk (X). (See [14, chapitres 8, 9] for missing details.) The main change is that, as announced in the introduction, we replace probability distributions by continuous games. One may object that LMPs are defined as measurable, not continuous, so that this definition overly restricts the class of transition systems we are considering. However, the mathematics are considerably cleaner when assuming continuity. Moreover, the weak topology is so weak that, for example, it only restrains θ ℓ so that x → θ ℓ (x)(U ) is continuous as a function from X to R + , equipped with its Scott topology; this certainly allows it to have jumps. Finally, one may argue, following Edalat [10] , that any second countable locally compact Hausdorff space X can be embedded as a set of maximal elements of a continuous cpo (namely Q(X); other choices are possible) so that any measure on X extends to a continuous valuation on Q(X). This provides a theory of approximation of integration on X through domain theory. One may hope a similar phenomenon will apply to games-for some notion of games yet to be defined on Borel subsets, not opens. Logic. Following [8, 5] , define the logic L ⊤∧∨ open by the grammar shown right, where ℓ ∈ L, r ∈ Q ∩ [0, 1] in the last line. Compared to [8, 5] , we only have one extra disjunction operator. The same logic, with disjunction, is shown to characterize simulation for LMPs in [9, Section 2.3].
Let F θ be the set of states x ∈ X where F holds:
is the set of states x such that the preprobability δ ℓ ( F θ ) that the next state y will satisfy F on firing an ℓ action is strictly greater than r. Note that this is well-defined, precisely because δ ℓ is continuous from X to a space of games with the weak topology. Also, it is easy to see that F θ is always open. Simulation. Now define simulation in the spirit of event bisimulation [5] (we shall see below why we do not call it bisimulation). For any topology O on X coarser than that of X, let X : O be X equipped with the topology O. A simulation topology for θ is a topology O on X, coarser than that of X, such that δ ℓ is continuous from X : O to J ≤1 wk (X : O), i.e., δ −1 ℓ [U > r] ∈ O for each U ∈ O and each r ∈ R. (A close notion was introduced in [31, Theorem 29] .) One non-explanation for this definition is to state that this is exactly event bisimulation [5] , only replacing σ-algebras by topologies. A better explanation is to revert back to Larsen and Skou's original definition of probabilistic bisimulation in terms of an algebra of tests (in slightly more abstract form). A (bi)simulation should not be thought as an arbitrary equivalence relation, rather as one generated from a collection T st of tests, which are subsets A of X: x ∈ X passes the test iff x ∈ A, it fails it otherwise. Two elements are equivalent iff they pass the same tests. Now in a continuous setting it only makes sense that the tests be open: any open U defines a continuous predicate χ U from X to the Sierpiński space S = {0, 1} (with the Scott topology of 0 ≤ 1), and conversely. Let O T st be the topology generated by the tests T st. It is sensible to require that δ −1 ℓ [U > r] be a test, too, at least when U is a finite union of finite intersections of tests (for the general case, appeal to the fact that δ ℓ (x) is continuous, and that any open can be approximated by such a finite union): one can indeed test whether x ∈ δ −1 ℓ [U > r] by firing transitions according to the preprobability δ ℓ (x), and test (e.g., by sampling, knowing that if δ ℓ (x) is a belief function for example, then we are actually playing also against a demonic adversary C) whether our chances of getting to a state y ∈ U exceed r. And this is essentially how we defined simulation topologies.
Every simulation topology O defines a specialization quasi-ordering O , which is the analogue of the standard notion of simulation here. (Note that in the case of event bisimulation, i.e., taking σ-algebras instead of topologies, O would be an equivalence relation-because σ-algebras are closed under complements-justifying the fact that event bisimulation really is a bisimulation, while our notion is a simulation.) Write This can be used, as is standard in the theory of Markov chains, to lump states. Given a topology O, let X/O be the quotient space X/≡ O , equipped with the finest topology such that q O :
. Taking direct images preserves monotonicity, modularity, (total) convexity, (total) concavity, and continuity. open and x ∈ X, x and q O (x) satisfy the same formulae:
Rewards and payoffs. A classical problem on Markov decision processes is to evaluate average payoffs. Since LMPs and ludic transition systems are so similar, we can do exactly the same. Imagine P plays according to a finite-state program Π, i.e., an automaton with internal states q, q ′ and transitions q ℓ −→q ′ . Let r q ℓ −→q ′ : X → R be a family of bounded continuous reward functions: we may think that r q ℓ −→q ′ (x) is the amount of money P gains if she fires her internal transition q ℓ −→q ′ , drawing the next state y at random along θ ℓ (x). Let γ q ℓ −→q ′ ∈ (0, 1] be a family of so-called discounts. Define the average payoff, starting from state x when P is in its internal state q, by:
This formula would be standard if θ ℓ (x) were a probability distribution. What is less standard is what (4) means when θ ℓ (x) is a game. E.g., when θ ℓ (x) is a simple belief function n ℓ i=1 a iℓx u Q iℓx , then:
where we see that P has control over the visible transitions ℓ, and tries to maximize his payoff (sup), while C will minimize it, and some averaging is taking place in-between. The equation (4) When θ ℓ is a simple belief function, Equation (5) is then a Bellman-type equation that can be solved by dynamic programming techniques. Then observe that any continuous belief function is the directed lub of simple belief functions by Theorem 2, under mild assumptions. This offers a canonical way to approximate the average payoff V q .
